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Government and business leaders, terrorist cells, and ponderous concatenations of organized crime all
put a premium on security. Especially vital are obtaining and protecting information. Counterintelligence
facilitates these endeavors through impeding one's putative and ersatz allies, one's real and imaginary
adversaries, and one's mythical neutrals from their vital attempts at obtaining and protecting
information. Their attempts include impeding one's own vital attempts at obtaining and protecting
information, their attempts at impeding one's own vital attempts to impede their vital attempts, and on
and on in an iterative process constrained only by wisdom, creativity, and paranoia.
Based on the above, the essence of counterintelligence may make a world of smoke and mirrors look
like seeing forever on a clear day. This essence has become even further convoluted and involuted
thanks to contributions from intellectual perspectives such as cultural science, constructivism,
deconstructivism, hermeneutics, and semiotics. Their contributions include viewing concepts such as
reality and causality as (1) mere hypothetical constructs far distant on some nomological net from an at
best tenuous physical reality; (2) arbitrarily derived terms mirroring some delusional notion of social
consensus; (3) totally projective and fecund with unspeakable conflicts and solipsistic meanings; (4)
continuously negotiated products among interlocutors motivated to seek value, meaning, or, en
attendant Godot, nothing at all; or as (5) mirroring a Zeitgeist which often is not contemporaneously
apparent but must await analysis by cultural morticians, if not, cultural archaeologists.
All of these contributions and still others making the circuits of the salon and academia are sometimes
all lumped together under the aegis of postmodernism. Although aging analysts may resonate with such
a term that could presage a life after youth and generative maturity, a close reading brings much
pessimism and, perhaps, nostalgia for previous eras in which "certainty" seemed more certain. To the
counterintelligence professional, however, this close reading brings sheer terror. With notions of reality
and causality under assault, how can one carry on business with any sincere sense of knowing what one
is doing? At times like this, a security bureaucracy's penchant for inertia, ignorance, hubris, and
inviolability in the guise of professionalism and wisdom may seem adaptive.
Let's take a specific case. One significant component of counterintelligence is personnel security,
comprising the policies and procedures employed in selecting, training, and managing personnel to
optimize their trustworthiness. The operational core of trustworthiness is supporting all iterations of
obtaining and protecting information as approved by one's organization. And organizations often go to
great lengths to identify life event and personality factors which have predictive validity for behaviors
suggesting trustworthiness or, for that matter, untrustworthiness. These factors are overtly and covertly
appraised during screening interviews, background and periodic investigations, tests, and the like. How
interesting, then, that based on these factors, an individual who is arguably one of the greatest
counterintelligence geniuses of the 20th century might not be employed today by a security
bureaucracy.
Felix Dzerzhinsky is often cited by historians as the founder and/or first leader of what are generically
termed variants of the Soviet security police-- the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Vcheka,) then
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the State Political Administration (GPU,) lastly the United State Political Administration (OGPU.) It is said
he exhibited a legendary single-mindedness of purpose in pursuing Soviet political goals, employed
superlative management and administrative skills, and demonstrated unsurpassed ingenuity in
developing counterintelligence techniques, viz., the front group. (His huge role in the "Red Terror" of
murders and assassinations was viewed not as a crime by his boss, Lenin, but as a political necessity,
which was discharged admirably.)
Yet Dzerzhinsky's life contains much which surely would raise red flags of security risk to
counterintelligence experts of any era. He (1) was born of another nation and culture, Polish, not
Russian, and was raised in a spirit of rigid Polish patriotism; (2) was born to a family with roots in a social
class, the petit bourgeoisie, which later was one primary target of Soviet political violence; (3)
experienced-- at age five-- the death of his father; (4) was imbued early on with a strict-- some would
say fanatic-- Catholicism, almost entered a seminary, yet was to serve an officially atheistic regime, and
may unconsciously have viewed his acceptance of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a religious conversion; (5)
often displayed rage and a tempestuous anger; (6) seemed to have no value system and instead
apparently needed to completely identify with a cause or all-encompassing ideology; (7) could
ostensibly have good reason to hate Russia because of the noxious consequences for many Poles under
Alexander III's Russification program; (8) was very intense, nervous, seemed to psychosomatize conflict,
and had significant medical problems including tuberculosis; (9) had at least one period of academic
difficulty wherein he failed in his studies, Russian of all things; and (10) may have experienced during his
adolescence and through his idealism the sort of exploitation by a charismatic political leader
(Moravsky) that counterintelligence experts seek to effect not be affected by.
And what counterintelligence expert would expect dispassionate analysis and systematic operational
excellence from someone reputed to have said, "I can neither hate nor love by halves. I simply cannot
give only half of my spirit. I either give all or nothing." Or this: "I loathe with every fiber all injustice,
crime, drunkenness, depravity, excess, extravagance, brothels in which people sell their bodies or souls,
or both; I detest oppression, fratricidal strife and national discord...I want to see humanity surrounded
with love, to warm it and cleanse it of the filth of modern life." And yet this: "...And woe to the man who
lacks the strength to overcome his feelings." And lastly this. "For me the end...can only be the grave."
Paradoxically, Dzerzhinsky stands not only as a case in point for the postmodernists who will deconstruct
a term like trust at the drop of a hat and who could view him as an Anti-Trust who commanded The
Trust. He also can serve as an avatar, a prisoner of unconscious emotions that may predictability fuel
political behavior regardless of postmodernist protestations to the contrary. (See Author. (May 23 and
July 12, 1990.) S.2726: To improve U.S. counterintelligence measures: Hearings. Clinton, W. J. (August 2,
1995.) Executive Order 12968. Access to classified information. Gerson, L. D. (1973.) The shield and the
sword: Felix Dzerzhinskii and the establishment of the Soviet secret police. Doctoral dissertation. The
George Washington University.) (Keywords: counterintelligence, personnel security, postmodernism,
trust.)
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